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Abstract 
 
Project failure in the Information Technology (IT) sector is well documented in 
the literature; project managers miss their target budgets and schedules more than twice 
as often as they meet them. Traditional project management methodologies initially 
developed for the large-scale engineering projects of the 1950’s, while still relevant and 
useful, are reductionist in nature and are therefore missing a systems approach that 
concentrates on knowledge creation before, during and after a project. The research 
presented herein will demonstrate the role of system dynamics in augmenting a project’s 
control processes, as well as the skill set used by the project manager. Research from a 
wide variety of projects within the information technology sector will be synthesized, 
some using system dynamics methodologies, and will serve as the basis to comparatively 
analyze the value added using this novel project management approach. The project 
dynamics and lessons learned within will illustrate the complex interactions and feedback 
structures inherent in all projects, as well as seek to educate project managers on their 
cause-effect relationships. Furthermore, the research will illustrate problematic project 
dynamics, using various conceptual models, and suggest the need to integrate system 
dynamics methodologies for project management into traditional project management 
processes and bodies of knowledge instead of solely relying on them as a post-mortem 
tool for project analysis. 
  
I.  Introduction 
While the discipline of project management has been around since early 
civilization, it has gained importance in recent decades as a rapidly growing management 
discipline in a wide variety of public and private organizations. Its modern practice began 
in the 1950’s with large defense, aerospace engineering and construction projects; 
however, recent trends such as globalization, corporate down-sizing, shorter product life 
cycles, accelerated technological change and increased market competition have all 
contributed to what David Cleland, a project management scholar, refers to as the rise of 
the “Age of Project Management” (Gray and Larson 2000). One particular class of 
projects (information technology) fail at an alarming rate (Standish Group 2009) and the 
discipline remains inadequately researched and poorly understood compared to the other 
more established management disciplines like operations management and new product 
development. For example, out of the more than 7000 Harvard Business School case 
studies, only 2% mention the discipline of project management and out of those there are 
only a few dozen that deal with real project management related issues (Shenhar, Dvir 
2007). 
Project failures, delays and cost over-runs are all well documented in the literature 
and adequately illustrate the problems all organizations face with their project related 
initiatives. According to a Standish Group study (2009), only 32 percent of information 
technology (IT) projects are successful, 24 percent are failures, and 44 percent were 
completed but delivered late, over budget and/or without the required scope. In other 
words, over two-thirds of all IT projects either fail to deliver on the project management 
plan but still deliver something, or simply never produce a deliverable at all. Some other 
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studies show that upwards of 85 percent of projects, across a wide range of industries, 
miss their scheduling and budget goals; on average, these failed projects miss their 
schedule goals by as much as 70 percent and their budget goals by as much as 60 percent 
(Shenhar and Dvir, 1993). However, 100 and 200 percent cost over runs very common as 
well (Sterman 1992).  
Multiple operational methods have been deployed since the 1950’s to address the 
need to better manage projects; however, there has been considerable emphasis on 
methodologies and tools (e.g. PERT, Work Breakdown Structure, Critical Path Method, 
GANT Charts, Earned Value Analysis) that focus on dissecting projects into their 
component parts and emphasizing that if each part can be understood and managed the 
project as a whole can be understood and managed. These tools are focused on providing 
important and useful methods for operational concerns and project planning; however, 
some studies suggest that the main causes of project failure lie predominantly in strategic 
areas such as the political, legal and behavioral aspects of projects (Rodrigues and 
Bowers 1997). 
Moreover, regardless of the increased success of these operational tools, projects 
still routinely fail and cost organizations in both the private and public sectors $80 - $145 
billion per year in the process (Standish Group 2009). These reductionist strategies to 
project control are useful models; however, they are myopic because they often times fail 
to properly account for the project’s macro view and the reality that slight perturbations 
in any of the component parts of a project schedule can have cascading and escalating 
effects on other work packages and the project as a whole; thereby causing increased 
error rates and the potential to miss schedule and budget targets. Poor project success 
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rates suggest the need to not only better theoretically define and understand the 
discipline, but to also reexamine the standard methodologies used and develop new 
strategies to modify, replace or augment those traditional approaches.  
System Dynamics is one area of research that has begun to tackle this problem 
from the strategic perspective and aid in management’s ability to understand complex 
socio-technical systems. It is a methodology used by both industry and academia to 
model, simulate and manage complex feedback mechanisms (System Dynamics Society 
2009). Such mechanisms are universally present in large IT projects and, as the literature 
suggests, often the cause of project failure. Much like other systems approaches to 
problem solving, system dynamics focuses more attention on the higher level dynamics 
(i.e. feedback) that exists between project components. These dynamics can often 
produce counter-intuitive behavior and directly affect project success rates. Within a 
system dynamics framework, less attention is paid to traditional Project Management 
Institute (PMI) models and methodologies such as Program Evaluation and Review 
Technique (PERT), Work Breakdown Structure (WBS), GANT charts and Earned Value 
Analysis (EVA), which serve as complimentary toolsets, but are considered to be more 
detailed operational methods for project management. 
The goal for this paper is to present a comparative analysis between traditional 
models and methods of project management and the recent developments in the use of 
system dynamics to augment the more traditional operational approaches with a higher 
level strategic understanding of how certain project dynamics affect project outcomes. A 
review of the project management and system dynamics literature will serve as the basis 
for the research and provide the foundation to draw conclusions about system dynamics’ 
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value to the project management body of knowledge. The intent here is not to build a 
running quantitative system dynamics model, but rather synthesize existing research and 
models, into an integrated framework of lessons learned that will help project managers 
in the field better understand the dynamic and complex nature of projects and the purpose 
and value of the system dynamics methodology. Based on this research, suggestions for 
future research will be presented, such as the development of quantitative models that are 
dynamic in nature and integrated into the traditional PMI body of knowledge and project 
management framework. The paper will explore the possibility of integrating system 
dynamics models into the project management process instead of the more traditional 
method of using them strictly as a post-mortem performance analysis tool. 
II.  The Problem 
a. Current State of Project Performance 
Contemporary business processes are more complex than in decades past and 
resemble structures with more interrelationships and interdependencies. It is becoming 
clear that the conventional (i.e. reductionist) project management methods are inadequate 
for handling this new era of complexity. The Project Management Institute recognizes 
this trend and research is currently underway by PMI, as well as others in academia, to 
learn how best to manage complex projects (Haas 2009). Management styles and 
organizational structures are also following this trend towards complexity. Historically, 
managers subscribed to a Newtonian philosophy of management resembling a machine 
model predicated on linear thinking, control theory and predictability; this model is 
proving very difficult to tender in the new era of complexity (Lewis 2008, Hart 2009, 
Haas 2009). Some executives are even rejecting traditional organizational structures in 
favor of more complex models, like the matrix organization, or another type that Haas 
(2009) refers to as “alliances,” whereby an organization creates an organizational 
structure comprised of complex interrelationships between suppliers, partners, regulatory 
entities, customers and sometimes even competitors. Out of the complex organizations, 
complex projects are born. 
 The project management literature over the last three decades suggests a poor 
performance record for complex IT projects; particularly with regards to software 
development projects (Brooks 1975, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, Rodrigues 1996, 
Dorsey 2000, Lewis 2008, Haas 2009, Hart 2009). Some of the literature following this 
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trend references The CHAOS Report by the Standish Group (2009), which is considered 
to be the most comprehensive, ground-breaking study to-date on information technology 
related project performance. Since its first release in 1994, the Standish Group has 
followed the IT industry’s performance, or lack thereof, and has regularly updated The 
CHAOS REPORT roughly every two years. 
Year 
Successful 
Projects 
Failed 
Projects 
Challenged 
Projects 
2008 32% 24% 44% 
2006 35% 19% 46% 
2004 29% 18% 53% 
2000 28% 23% 49% 
1998 26% 28% 44% 
1996 27% 40% 33% 
1994 16% 31% 53% 
 
Table 1: CHAOS Report for IT project performance from 1994-2008 (Standish Group 2009). 
The original report in 1994 uncovered significant failure rates for IT projects (e.g. 
web application development, software development, systems integration) and estimated 
that these failures cost government agencies and corporations $80 billion - $145 billion 
per year (Standish Group 2009). The report features three categories of project 
performance – successful, challenged and failed. Successful projects refer to those that 
were delivered on time, on budget and with the desired scope. Challenged projects refer 
to those where the project was completed but was delivered late, over budget and without 
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the required scope. Failed projects refer to those where the project was not completed, 
canceled or delivered something of no value to the customer. 
 While The CHAOS Report data suggests a marginal improvement in project 
performance between 1994 and 2008, it also highlights the continued challenges facing 
the IT industry and the project management discipline, as well as the recent dip in project 
performance between 2006 and 2008. Furthermore, the data is even more troubling when 
one considers that although 32 percent of projects were on time and on budget, most were 
originally over-estimated (Standish Group 2009). Focus groups indicated that “IT 
executives reported that they first get their best estimates, multiply by two and then add a 
half. It should not be surprising therefore, that the majority of these successful projects 
were already 150% over budget before they began” (Standish Group 2001).   
In addition, the research suggests that the bigger the size of the project, which 
often times correlates to higher project complexity, the higher the failure rate (Standish 
Group 1999). Johnson states, "seventy-three percent of projects with labor cost of less 
than $750,000 succeed, but only 3 percent of projects a with labor cost of over $10 
million succeed. I would venture to say the 3 percent that succeed succeeded because 
they overestimated their budget, not because they were managed properly" (COOK 
2008). The research suggests there are three metrics that are key to predicting, with a 
high degree of certainty, whether or not a project will be successful – the project size, the 
project duration and the size of the project team. The research confirms what many 
project managers may have sensed all along; that smaller projects with shorter durations 
and smaller teams have a better chance at success compared to projects that are large with 
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long durations. The 2001 report suggests a sweet spot for projects to be at four months, 
with four team members and a cost of less than $500,000 (Standish Group 2001). 
Haas (2009) suggests that the reason for the overall improvement in projects, as 
seen in the CHAOS Report, is due to the following three factors: 1) Average project costs 
has been reduced by more than half since 2001; 2) more emphasis has been placed on 
using project managers and project management methodologies for complex IT projects; 
and 3) better methodologies and tools for change/configuration management have been 
developed and deployed. However, considering that the most recent data shows over two-
thirds of all IT projects were over budget, over schedule or failed outright, and the fact 
that the Standish Group (2009) predicts that the number of critical projects will double 
every year it is apparent that the industry and the discipline still have a considerable 
challenge ahead to increase project performance to levels where management has 
confidence in the investments associated with these often large scale and dynamically 
complex projects.  
 Shenhar and Dvir (2007) recently conducted a study which spanned 15 years and 
more than 600 complex projects across the globe in business, non-profit and government 
sectors. Their research demonstrates yet another example of poor project performance 
when one considers that 85 percent of the projects studied failed to meet budget and 
schedule goals. On average, schedules were overrun by 70 percent and budgets by 60 
percent (Shenhar Dvir, 2007). They concluded that “executives as well as project teams 
failed to appreciate up front the extent of uncertainty and complexity involved (or failed 
to communicate this extent to each other) and failed to adapt their management style to 
the situation” (Shenhar Dvir 2007). Furthermore, in the public sector, the Office of 
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Management and Budget (OMB) conducted a study in 2003 that concluded there was an 
unsustainable risk of failure among 771 projects with a total cost of $20.9 billion 
included in the fiscal year 2004 budget (OMB 2003).  
b. Project Complexity and the Case for New Models 
Complex projects require a team effort of experienced project managers, technical 
architects, developers, business analysts and executive leadership with a keen eye on 
strategy. These teams consist of complex adaptive social systems nested in diverse 
organizations, which in turn are nested in our increasingly dynamic economic, political 
and social environments. Once an organization defines the right projects to undertake, the 
question as to how to best do the projects (i.e. what methodology/process) becomes 
critical to the success of the project (Haas 2009). While traditional methods of project 
management are still relevant and useful, they are not always the best methodologies to 
select in today’s environment. Projects in the 21st century require new methods of 
thinking and new approaches, some of which might replace traditional methods and some 
of which will augment them. The Project Complexity Model pioneered by Haas (2009) 
provides the project manager with a three step process to ensure that: 
1. A project leader with the appropriate skill set is assigned 
2. The project leader selects the appropriate project cycle 
3. The management style selected is appropriate given the project’s level of 
complexity. 
The traditional approach to project management resembles a logical, linear, 
reductionist process to achieve a goal. It primarily involves the management of tasks and 
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making sure those task are completed on time, within budget constraints and to the 
technical specifications of the customer. The methodology is a well defined one whereby 
the project manager/team performs the following linear progression: 
1. Define the problem 
2. Decompose the problem into its component parts (milestones, work-packages, 
activities) 
3. Develop a plan to address the problem 
4. Execute the work addressed in the plan 
5. Integrate the decomposed parts into the final solution 
6. Deliver/deploy the solution 
The logic behind the traditional approach is that if we can reduce the problem down 
to manageable components, develop a plan to manage those components and then 
execute and control changes to that highly structured plan, we can therefore reduce the 
overall complexity and risk associated with the project (Project Management Institute 
PMI 2008, Gido and Clements 2009, Haas 2009, Lewis 2008). This methodology, born 
out of mathematical models and structured planning approaches to manage large 
aerospace engineering and construction projects of the 1950’s, works well for projects 
where requirements are well understood and stable. However, projects in the information 
technology sector, and more specifically software projects, are often times highly 
complex, with volatile and ambiguous requirements; therefore, a new paradigm is 
emerging; one that is more complex, adaptive, agile and iterative (Loch et al 2006, Haas 
2009). 
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Figure 1: Twelve factors that produce complex projects (Haas 2009). Modern information technology 
projects often consist of several of these factors leading to increased project complexity and the 
associated increased project performance risks. 
 The Project Management Research Program is currently exploring the application 
of complexity theory to project management and what that area of science can provide to 
better understand the nature of complex projects (Haas 2009). In addition, new and more 
adaptive system development methodologies are emerging that emphasize agile and 
iterative techniques instead of the more traditional approaches, which place more 
emphasis on planning and control. A hybridization of these two methods is most likely 
the answer to handling different types of projects appropriately. 
c. Software Development Projects 
Software and web application development projects are complex in nature, 
involving technical knowledge-work that does not produce the linear relationships 
between system variables (e.g. the relationship between number of developers and lines 
of bug-fee code) often found in more tangible product production such as manufacturing 
and construction. For example, if one were to paint a house, the project’s schedule length 
Project Complexity Factors
1. Large scope
2. Long duration
3. Urgent
4. Volitile requirements
5. Ambiguous requirements
6. Politically sensitive
7. Highly Visible
8. Large scale cultural
9. Heavily dependent on external 
factors/constratints
10. Unproven technology
11. Vague business problems, 
opportunities or solutions
12. Multiple dispersed and diverse cross‐
functional teams
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would decrease almost linearly (up to a certain point) based on how many painters the 
project manager had for the task; this is not the case with IT projects and software/web 
application development in particular. Adding an extra developer to a project does not 
ensure that twice as many lines of bug-free code will be deployed. The complexity 
inherent in software development, and the project management practices that seek to 
control and improve its performance, have been well studied in recent decades and can be 
traced back as far as a report by the Comptroller General in 1979 citing the “software 
crisis” that existed in the federal government (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991). The 
report concluded that “the government got for its money less than 2 percent of the total 
value of the contracts” (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, 3). Project performance for 
software development has improved marginally since then but is still deficient according 
to the Standish Group’s Chaos report (2009). Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) 
produced a pioneering study in an attempt to understand the systemic issues involving 
software development and produce a working quantitative model that illustrates the 
complex interactions and causal connections between variables affecting software 
development. 
 Figure 2 illustrates a high level subsystem diagram for software development and 
demonstrates the key interactions between the planning, controlling, human resources 
management and software production components of any software development effort. 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) suggest that in order to get a better understanding of 
the software development process we needed a fully integrated model that took other 
variables into account instead of the traditional practice of focusing solely on the 
software production subsystem.  
13 
   
 
 
 
Figure 2: Fully integrated subsystem diagram for software development project dynamics (Abdel-
Hamid and Madnick 1991). 
The Human Resource subsystem is comprised of functions such as hiring, training 
and assimilation. Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) recognized that these functions do 
not operate as independent and exogenous variables to the system, but rather as 
endogenous variables that both affect and are affected by the other subsystems. For 
example, the Work Force Available influences the allocation of human resources in the 
Software Production subsystem and both the Controlling subsystem and Planning 
subsystem have a direct affect on the Human Resource subsystem, and therefore the 
Workforce Available (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991). 
The Planning subsystem accounts for project estimation activities that directly 
affect both the project schedule and the work force needed to develop the software. 
Estimates are initially produced and subsequently revised throughout the life-cycle of the 
project. These estimates create the environment in which management interventions, such 
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as adding more people to the project or adjusting the project schedule, take place and can 
lead to some of the unintended and counter-intuitive project behaviors referenced in 
Figure 13. 
The Software Production subsystem comprises of four development activities: 
development, quality assurance, rework and testing. The Controlling subsystem 
represents those activities by which project managers track progress in development 
activities vs. the project plan and make adjustments. Unfortunately, tracking progress in 
software development is extremely difficult because the intended product (i.e. 
“software”) remains intangible for most of the development process. This makes it very 
difficult for both developers and the project managers to determine how far along the 
project has progressed (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991, Hart 2009). 
As previously mentioned, this is one of the major differences between information 
systems/software development project management control and accounts for much of the 
complexity and performance problems associated with managing software projects. The 
inability to accurately measure progress directly affects the project manager’s ability to 
effectively control the project schedule, budget and performance. Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnick (1991) suggest this is primarily the result of how software development projects 
are measured, using the surrogate variable, consumptions of resources, as a way to 
measure progress instead of a more tangible method you might see in manufacturing or 
construction. They assert that along with underestimation, this inability to precisely 
measure software project progress is one of the contributing factors in producing the 90% 
syndrome – a common form of project failure where estimates of the fraction of work 
completed reaches roughly 90% completion according to the original project schedule but 
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then stalls as the task completion rate starts to decrease. In some cases the project takes 
just as long if not longer to finish the final 10% as it did to finish the first 90% (Abdel-
Hamid 1990, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1988, 1991, Ford and Sterman 2003, Lyneis 
and Ford 2007, Hart 2009). 
d. The 90% Syndrome in Systems/Software Development 
In the project management and software development literature the 90% 
syndrome refers to a type of project failure where estimates of the fraction of work 
completed reaches roughly 90% according to the original project schedule but then stalls 
(Abdel-Hamid 1988). Sterman (1992) concisely defines the syndrome by stating that “a 
project is thought to be 90% complete for half the total time required” (1992, 1). In more 
layman’s terms, projects have an uncanny way of appearing to be on target and 
proceeding as planned until they near their end; however, even though project 
management planning and control took place, the rate of progress stalls as the scope of 
the endeavor grows, the resource requirements increase and/or the errors made early on in 
the development process lead to schedule pressure, schedule slippage, overtime, poor 
product quality and potentially yet more rework. 
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Figure 3: Classic S-shaped limits to growth representation of the 90% syndrome. Cumulative 
progress increases at a decreasing rate once the project nears 90% completion according to the 
original project plan (Ford and Sterman 2003). 
 There are several reasons cited in the literature for this project phenomenon. 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) attribute it primarily to the interaction between two 
factors: project size (i.e. scope) underestimation and man-day underestimation (i.e. 
human resources). As one might expect, if the project scope is underestimated from the 
beginning there is a greater chance for the 90% syndrome to appear due to the following 
characteristics surrounding many software development projects. Early on in the project, 
the ability of the project manager to effectively measure progress is hampered because 
software is mostly intangible for much of its development and progress is often measured 
by the rate of resource expenditures instead of actual accomplishments (e.g. bug-free 
lines of code or functioning software modules); this in turn creates the illusion that the 
project is on schedule (Abdel-Hamid 1991).  
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Once the project progresses into its later stages, the discrepancy between 
resources expenditures and completed tasks becomes increasingly apparent to both the 
project team members and the project manager. This produces a better appreciation for 
the actual amount of work left; often times the inevitable discovery and underestimation 
of rework exacerbates the syndrome, leading to a prolonged stall or outright failure (Ford 
and Sterman 2003). Furthermore, progress can continue to decline as a result of ill-
advised managerial responses to the schedule failure. For example, such “corrective 
actions” as adding more developers, pushing the deadline, engaging in concurrent 
development and/or requiring overtime, produce what Ford and Lyneis (2007) categorize 
as “ripple” and “knock-on” effects. These actions often activate feedback dynamics, 
induced and exacerbated by management interventions, which can have the unintended 
consequence of producing an increase in the error rate, further reduced productivity and 
further delays. 
The second factor Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) attribute to the syndrome is 
man-day underestimation. According to their model, the syndrome is more severe when 
man-day requirements are underestimated than it is when size is underestimated (Abdel-
Hamid and Madnick, 1991). At first this might appear to be somewhat counterintuitive; 
however, a closer examination of the case study and model results reveals that when size 
is underestimated the syndrome is less severe for two reasons: 1) because problems with 
the estimation of project scope tend to be detected faster in the project life cycle than 
problems with labor estimates and size underestimation, and 2) because when size is 
underestimated, and subsequently detected in the early stages of the project, man-days 
estimates are often revised appropriately (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick, 1991).   
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Man-day requirements often remain undetected until late in the life cycle when 
the majority of the budgeted man-days have been consumed; this occurs because it isn’t 
until the later stages of a project when the budgeted man-days are exhausted and the team 
members are able to effectively perceive how productive they have actually been (Abdel-
Hamid and Madnick 1991). Bringing additional resources into the project during its 
critical late stages (when the rework cycle starts to dominate), instead of earlier in the 
project lifecycle, increases the project’s potential for Brooks’ Law (i.e. adding resources 
to a late software projects only makes it later), as well as other supporting ripple and 
knock-on effects (Lyneis and Ford 2007), further degrading schedule/project performance 
(Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991). 
In addition to Abdel-Hamid and Madnick’s assertions on the causes for the 90% 
syndrome, Ford and Sterman (2003) also provided insights through their study of 
concurrent engineering projects. Concurrent engineering refers to a method by which 
certain tasks, work packages and/or project milestones are developed in parallel rather 
than serial formation. For example, in the case of software development, a project 
manager might choose to overlap (i.e. work in parallel) the design and development tasks 
in an effort to reduce the total schedule length of those task, as compared to working 
them in serial order.  
Ford and Sterman (2003) developed a system dynamics model to better 
understand the interactions between the process structure of concurrent development and 
the project team members’ behavioral decision-making processes. Their model 
demonstrates the strength behind the system dynamics methodology; its ability to 
integrate managerial decision-making into the various physical information processes 
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involved in any software development effort. The results from their research illustrate 
how the interaction between development processes (e.g. overlapping activities/task 
sequencing, activity durations and rework), as well as the behaviors of management and 
developers deliberately concealing rework (i.e. “the Liars Club”), creates a detrimental 
dynamic leading to unplanned iterations and a lower quality product at a higher than 
estimated cost (Ford and Sterman 2003). They assert that concurrent engineering actually 
increases the risk of producing the 90% syndrome because it increases a project’s 
vulnerability to multiple iterations and errors, as well as actually increasing the fraction 
of work requiring changes or additional iterations (Ford and Sterman 2003). 
Their research outlines the “Liar’s Club” as a social/behavioral phenomenon in 
projects whereby project teams conceal rework in order to avoid the responsibility of 
failure, prevent blame escalation or retaliation from peers and to solve their own 
problems under cover and free from management intervention. This behavior illustrates 
the importance of considering (i.e. factoring them into models) individual and team 
behaviors, a practiced widely used in system dynamics modeling, when devising policies 
to improve project performance in concurrent development projects (Ford and Sterman 
2003). According to Ford and Sterman (2003, 217), “Process changes cannot improve 
concurrent development project performance if they do not also address the behaviors 
that drive iteration cycles such as the policy of concealing rework requirements.” In other 
words, without considering and addressing how people truly behave in socio-technical 
systems, the project manager can continue in vain to tweak development processes ad 
infinitum, only to realize that the project team’s socio-cultural incentive structure 
continues to wreak havoc on the final project outcome. 
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The literature referenced in this research focuses on the use of system dynamics 
modeling and simulation, which provides a better understanding of the project behaviors, 
such as the aforementioned 90% syndrome, as well as quantitative data to support the 
anecdotal evidence encountered by many project managers in the field. The goal for 
project managers should be to first develop a richer understanding of dynamic project 
behaviors, which include individual, management and project planning/estimation 
behaviors. Armed with that knowledge, they must use it to develop better strategies for 
handling project perturbations in a way that mitigates the risk of the 90% syndrome.  
These strategies should include, but are not limited to the use of, 1) better 
estimation tools for both project size and man-days requirements, remembering that 
project estimates create project behaviors and vice versa; the methods to also properly 
account for rework cycles and their critical position late in the project life-cycle, as well 
as the man-day considerations needed to effectively handle them, 2) improved methods to 
account for, manage and adjust the socio-cultural incentive structures associated with the 
concealment of rework (i.e. the Liar’s Club); the literature suggests agile development as 
a methodology to increase cycle speed and mitigate the syndrome’s risks; however, 
management’s communication styles/patterns, as well as their policies towards rework, 
must not institutionalize the desire to conceal problems and hide the “bad news,” and 
lastly, 3) the development, and  use of, commercially available software project 
management simulation tools (e.g. system dynamics models) that are widely accessible, 
intuitive, extensible, relevant and provide project managers with a robust learning 
environment from which to learn and become better dynamically driven decision makers.  
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Each one of these suggested strategies represents a component that must be 
considered in any attempt to improve the marginal success rate of software development 
and information technology projects. Simply addressing whichever component solution is 
conveniently located in close proximity has the potential to deliver minor incremental 
improvements, no improvements, or worse yet, aggravate the development process and 
deliver worse results than before. 
III.  Augmenting Traditional Project Management Methodologies using System    
Dynamics Lessons Learned 
a. What is System Dynamics? 
System Dynamics is a modeling and simulation methodology pioneered by Jay 
Forester at the MIT School of Management in the 1950’s and grounded in the 
mathematical theories of nonlinear dynamics and feedback control. Initially termed 
Industrial Dynamics, it was used by management teams who recognized the 
counterintuitive nature of their production systems and needed a problem solving method 
for analyzing the complex and dynamic nature of their production processes, inventories 
and services (Sterman 2000). Sterman (2000) concisely, yet precisely, describes it as, “a 
method to enhance learning in complex systems.” Since its inception, the methodology 
has been applied across a wide spectrum to solve problems and assist managers in the 
policy and decision making process.  
The discipline is predicated on the following main premises (Sterman 2000, 
Meadows 2008, Senge 1990) 
1. The behavior of any system, in other words its output, is principally 
caused by its structure and associated interrelationships and 
interdependencies between system components or variables.  
2. The system structure includes not only the physical aspects of the system 
but the policies and procedures that govern organizational decision-
making. 
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3. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Our intuitive judgment 
proves to be unreliable in understanding system behavior over time even 
when we think we fully understand the individual components of the 
system.  
4. All systems involve feedback processes which often produce counter-
intuitive system behavior. 
5. The key to understanding a system is to understand the causal connections 
and feedback structures that exist and how those interrelationships 
dynamically influence system behavior over time. 
One of the most fertile application areas for the system dynamics methodology is 
within the discipline of project management and, more specifically, the discipline’s 
application to software development and construction (Sterman 2000). In order to 
properly understand system dynamics, and its many contributions to project management, 
it is important to grasp some of the core concepts central to systems thinking, such as 
event-oriented vs. systems-oriented worldviews, mental models, single-loop vs. double-
loop learning, stocks, flows, feedback and delays. 
i. Event-oriented vs. Systems-oriented world views 
Central to the system dynamics methodology are the concepts of a systems-
oriented world view (figure 4), as opposed to the event-oriented worldview (figure 5). 
Quite often, these system characteristics govern the dynamic behavior of the systems 
themselves, leading many systems thinkers to the realization that a system’s output is 
more a function of the relationships between system components, than simply the sum of 
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each component. In other words, the output for a system/project is much more than the 
sum of all its parts (Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008, Senge 1990).  
 
Figure 4: An event-oriented world view assumes the problem is static in nature and develops as a 
result of some event or combination of events (Sterman 2000). 
 
 
Figure 5: A systems-oriented world view assumes the problem is dynamic in nature and arises as a 
natural consequence of dynamic relationships between the various system components. It broadens 
the scope of the model boundary, accounts for other actors, accounts for feedback dynamics and 
attempts to account for potential unintended consequences (Sterman 2000). 
For example, a project manager would be hard pressed to understand, or predict, 
the true outcome of any project by simply dissecting it down to its component part tasks, 
estimating, planning and scheduling the project. That approach is ignorant to the more 
holistic systems approach, which realizes that the slightest perturbations in any task can 
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have cascading and escalating effects throughout the lifecycle of the project, leading to 
increases in errors/rework, costs and schedule overruns. This higher level strategic 
perspective is considered to be one of system dynamics’ major contributions to the 
discipline of project management. 
ii. Mental Models and Single vs. Double-Loop Learning 
Another core concept in system dynamics is the notion of mental models, which 
refer to a person’s preconceived understanding about how some particular aspect of the 
world works (Sterman 2000). Senge (1990) describes mental models as “deeply ingrained 
assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures of images that influence how we 
understand the world and how we take action.” When we fail to recognize or subject our 
mental models to scrutiny or testing, our ability to learn and better manage complex 
systems is minimized. A systems approach to project management provides the project 
manager with a methodology to formally identify, test and adjust mental models so 
he/she can effectively understand and analyze all of the data presented instead of 
embarking on a path using a static, faulty or biased cognitive foundation. Constantly 
challenging our mental models leads to the process of double-loop learning (Sterman 
2000). 
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Figure 6: Mental models are important variables in problem solving activities and should be 
perpetually challenged as information feedback increases. These diagrams illustrate the difference 
between single loop learning (left) and double loop learning (right); they demonstrate how double 
loop learning uses information feedback from the system to refine, or in some cases replace, deeply 
held biases associated with the object of study, which in turn go on to affect our strategies and 
policies and produce yet more information feedback (Sterman 2000). 
 Galileo and Lord Kelvin both emphasized the importance of studying and 
quantifying the phenomena we wish to understand, with Kelvin stating, “to measure is to 
know.” A common maxim in the project management community also states that you 
cannot manage what you cannot measure, which is also commonly referred to as 
“management by fact,” compared to the opposite philosophy of intuitive decision-
making. Management by fact is advantageous compared to intuitive decision-making 
because it exposes the mangers mental models and challenges them to be continually re-
examined when the data supporting those mental models changes (i.e. double-loop 
learning). This is of course is not without difficulty when one considers the myriad of 
variables present in any decision-making process that are either un-quantifiable, or very 
difficult to establish consensus on how to properly quantify the variable. 
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 For example, in software development, variables such as customer satisfaction, 
team moral, team knowledge/expertise, project scope and latent software errors are all 
representative of variables Hart (2008) refers to as “fuzzy” or “soft variables;” these 
variables challenge the manager to provide data, and as Hart (2008) suggests, eventually 
“encounter the wall of measurability.” Thus, as managers, if we accept the philosophy 
inherent in managing by fact we are forced to ignore important soft variables present in 
our project. Ignoring these variables can produce negative systemic effects when 
intervention strategies are planned without regard to the effect these soft variables have 
on the intervention’s outcome; sometimes producing counter-intuitive side effects that 
ultimately degrade project performance.  
Properly integrating these soft variables into operational models is difficult 
practice; however, taking the easy way out and excluding them can lead to poorly 
performing intervention strategies and what Sterman (2000) and Meadows (2008) refer to 
as policy resistance, or “the tendency for interventions to be delayed, diluted, or defeated 
by the response of the system to the intervention itself” (Sterman 2000, 5).  As Senge 
(1990, 60) wisely states, “the easy way out usually leads right back in.” System dynamics 
for project management provides a methodology for effectively building both theoretical 
and quantitative models that integrate hard and soft variables into one model, properly 
illustrating the cause-effect relationships and systemic feedback structures. 
iii. Stocks, Flows and Causal Loop Diagrams 
 If one were to conceptualize the previously mentioned concepts as the 
philosophical foundations for systems thinking, then the concepts of stocks, flows and 
28 
   
 
 
causal loop diagrams would be considered its language. Peter Senge (1990) says the 
following regarding causal loop diagramming and the language of systems thinking: 
“Language shapes perception. What we see depends on what we are prepared to 
see. Western languages, with their subject-verb-object structure, are biased toward 
a linear view. If we want to see system-wide interrelationships, we need a 
language of interrelationships, a language made up of circles. … Such a language 
is important in facing dynamically complex issues and strategic choices, 
especially when individuals, teams and organizations need to see beyond events 
and into the forces that shape change.”  
More than any other tool, stock and flow diagrams lie at the foundation for 
systems thinking. Such diagrams describe dynamic system structure, and can be used to 
provide insight on the behaviors those structures produce. Without causal loop 
diagramming and the stock and flow models they seed, there is limited potential to 
expand system dynamics’ application via advanced tools such as: computer modeling and 
simulation, and digital learning environments that mimic flight simulators. 
Stocks are the system state variables, sometimes also referred to as system 
“reservoirs” because they represent accumulations in any system (e.g number of software 
defects, number of developers on a project). Meadows (2008) describes them as elements 
in a system that you can count feel or measure at any given point in time. They are 
accumulations and, therefore, are the main source of system buffer and delays. Flows on 
the other hand are rates (i.e. processes) that affect the stock accumulations in an 
increasing or decreasing fashion. If the sum of all inflows is greater than the sum of all 
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outflows the stock level will increase; if the sum of all outflows is larger the stock will 
decrease, and if inflows and outflows are equal, the system state remains in dynamic 
equilibrium (Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008). 
Understanding how system stocks and flows work, and their associated feedback 
structure, is critical to understanding the true nature and output of any system. For 
example, figure 7 depicts a simple population model stock and flow structure in an 
attempt to illustrate this important concept with a very simple, narrow boundary system 
(Sterman 2000). The Population stock is the system state variable we are concerned with 
understanding. It represents a snapshot in time and can be quantified using people as the 
units. The stock has two associated flows. On the left, there is the Births flow that adds 
people to the population stock. The left side represents a self-reinforcing (i.e. positive) 
feedback loop structure (R1), which indicates that as more people are born, and the 
population grows in size, there will be more births, which in turn increases the 
population. This kind of self-reinforcing feedback represents the classic exponential 
growth archetype (Senge 1990, Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008). To the right of the 
population stock is the Deaths flow. This side represents the balancing (i.e. negative) 
feedback loop structure (B1), which indicates that as the population increases, the number 
of deaths per unit of time will also increase, which in turn then decreases the population 
stock in a “goal seeking” fashion. 
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Figure 7: Population Model Stock and Flow Structure (Sterman 2000). 
The different polarities associated with each feedback arrow indicate how one 
variable influences the other. In the case of Births, for example, as either the Birth 
Fraction variable or the Population stock increases, so will the Births flow increase. The 
positive polarity sign indicates that these variables move in the same direction. However, 
on the right side balancing loop, as the Average Lifetime increases the number of deaths 
decreases. The negative polarity indicates that these variables move in opposite 
directions. 
iv. Feedback and Delays 
The feedback structure of any system, and the delays associated with that system, 
predominantly account for the system’s complex, dynamic and sometimes 
counterintuitive behavior. Simply put, feedback refers to the interactions among system 
variables. A feedback loop is formed when the inflows and outflows of a particular stock 
(e.g. population) are affected by changes in that stock. So in the case of figure 7, the size 
of the population stock directly affects both Births and Deaths flows and creates a 
feedback loop for each. These interactions comprise the structure of the system and, 
therefore, demonstrate how systems cause their own behaviors. Moreover, different 
systems with similar feedback structures (i.e. system archetypes) tend to exhibit similar 
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dynamic behaviors (Senge 1990, Sterman 2000, Meadows 2008). Figure 7 demonstrates 
both types of feedback loops – positive (R1 self-reinforcing) and negative (B1 
balancing). Positive feedback loops are runaway processes that produce exponential 
growth (e.g. compounding interest of bank account). Conversely, balancing feedback 
loops provide system stability and illustrate goal-seeking behavior (e.g. an increase in 
inventory increases sales which then decreases inventory). 
System delays, in addition to feedback structure, significantly determine system 
behaviors. Sterman (2000) describes delays as “a process whose output lags behind its 
input in some fashion.” Delays often produce stock oscillations, especially in a balancing 
feedback loops. In IT projects, and more specifically software/web application 
development, delays can affect the project’s outcome and complicate our ability to 
understand and potentially change the system/project behavior. Hart (2008) suggests 
there are three ways in which delays impact a system. First, delays produce reactions that 
are not necessarily proportional to the system’s observed conditions. Second, project 
team members act as if their decision making processes are based on current (real-time) 
data when in fact systemic delays assure this is not the case. And lastly, delays affect our 
ability to learn and properly decipher the cause-effect relationships among system 
variables. In software development, delays can be witnessed in the lag-time inherent 
between a customer’s perception of software quality and its actual quality, the delay 
associated with new-hire productivity gains and from a traditional project management 
perspective, the reality that project status reports often times do not truly reflect the 
project’s progress and are not always based on current information regarding the project 
(Hart 2008). 
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b. Systemic Project Dynamics in Software Development – The Dynamics of 
Schedule Pressure 
 
The occurrence of the aforementioned 90% syndrome in projects is well 
documented in the literature (Abdel-Hamid 1990, Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1988, 
1991, Sterman 1992, Ford and Sterman 2003, Lyneis and Ford 2007, Hart 2009) and the 
causes for the syndrome are extensive and complex in nature. While Adbel-Hamid and 
Madnick (1991) assert that the main causes can be attributed to underestimation and the 
imprecise measurement of project progress, other studies by Ford and Sterman (2003), 
Lyneis and Ford (2007) and Hart (2008) suggest the causes can be much wider and 
involve other factors such as the interaction between factors such as “the rework cycle” 
and project staffing trends throughout the lifecycle of the project. 
 
Figure 8: A typical development project rework cycle. Work packages move from the original work 
to do stock to the work done stock. In the process errors are discovered and sent back through the 
development process for "rework" (Lyneis and Ford 2007). 
The various behaviors, interrelationships and causal connections that typify most 
software and web development projects are illustrated in Figures 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13. 
These dynamics represent common behaviors referenced in the project management 
33 
   
 
 
literature and are important learning tools for project managers. They provide a 
foundation for shared understanding of typical behaviors that can lead to poor project 
performance, or outright failure. Furthermore, they can be used by project team members 
to identify project pitfalls, communicate systemic issues, design and adjust project 
policies and perform elementary risk-analysis. 
Figure 9 illustrates the core theoretical sub-model to the comprehensive model 
found in figure 13. It integrates a few of the more common policy decisions found in 
information technology projects and centers on the Schedule Pressure variable, which 
when increased or decreased throughout the project lifecycle can become both cause and 
effect for second the third order project effects . Lyneis and Ford (2007) refer to these as 
“ripple” and “knock-on” effects, which are the key causes of policy resistance.  
Various project control efforts (e.g. adding more developers, working overtime) 
cause ripple effects which are commonly understood as side effects to these well-
intentioned managerial interventions. These ripple effects then produce second and third 
order effects (e.g. errors/rework, out of sequence work), amplifying problems in the 
project and feeding back throughout the systems structure to produce counter-intuitive 
systemic project behaviors. Using these conceptual causal loop diagram models to 
effectively communicate these dynamics is an important initial step towards 
management’s improved understanding of the complex dynamics at play and their ability 
to learn and develop appropriate intervention strategies (Hart 2008). 
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Figure 9: Theoretical model illustrating common project schedule policy decisions and their systemic 
cause-effect relationships. Adapted from Sterman (2000). 
 A software/web application development project under Schedule Pressure can 
exhibit various behaviors that either lead to a reduction in Schedule Pressure or 
unintentionally feedback to produce an unintended increase in Schedule Pressure. When 
faced with Schedule Pressure, a project manager has an array of options to choose from 
should intervention become necessary. For example, overtime can be instituted to make 
up for lost time, the amount of time dedicated to each work package or task can be 
reduced (i.e. Cutting Corners, B2 and R2 from figure 9), or the project manager can 
decide to engage in concurrent development as referenced in both the R8 and B4 loops. 
Each one of these interventions is designed to reduce schedule pressure by increasing the 
rate of development; however, they each can produce unintended side effects that work to 
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counter those intended gains in productivity (Sterman 2000). The B1 loop in figure 9 
illustrates how an increase in overtime can increase the task completion rate, decrease the 
work remaining and form a feedback balancing loop by reducing the schedule pressure; 
however, R1 illustrates that an increase in overtime can also lead to developer fatigue, a 
decrease in productivity, and a decrease in the task completion rate, which then leads to 
an increase in the amount of work remaining and ultimately leads to more schedule 
pressure (Sterman 2000).  
Alternatively, the project manager could opt to reduce time per task (R2 loop in 
figure 9), which would be designed to boost productivity and in the end reduce schedule 
pressure; however, speeding up development by cutting corners can also increase the 
error rate because developers become less concerned with following sound systems 
development methodologies and instead focus on task completion regardless of the 
negative costs associated with it such as software bugs, errors and reduced functionality. 
Therefore, regardless of the intent of the policy, the reduction of time per task can often 
times lead to reductions in productivity and subsequently feed back to ultimately increase 
schedule pressure and perpetuate the negative feedback loop (Sterman 2000).  
Another option the project manager might consider is to engage in concurrent 
development (R8 and B4 of figure 9 by overlapping project work packages and/or phases 
in attempt to increase the development rate and boost productivity. This is an increasingly 
common practice in systems development (Ford and Sterman 2003) and is not without its 
own set of negative repercussions. Ford and Sterman (2003) assert that regardless of 
some success, implementing concurrent development has proven to be challenging for 
many project managers mainly because it increases the amount of communication 
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overhead (i.e. information transfers) between the project phases/tasks; therefore, more 
tasks are begun using preliminary or incomplete information and specifications. This 
leads to an increase in the number and length of iteration cycles, sometimes producing 
what Taylor and Ford (2006) refer to as “tipping points” in development projects 
whereby tipping point feedback structures push the project into “firefight mode” as errors 
pile up in ever increasingly taxed rework cycle and, therefore, further degrade project 
performance.  
B4 of figure 9 illustrates how an increase in concurrent development strategies 
increases the number of tasks being worked on simultaneously, which leads to an increase 
in productivity and then feeds back to reduce schedule pressure. However, the increase in 
concurrence can also increase the interdependency between tasks, which can increase the 
error rate and after some delay lead to a decrease in productivity as more and more errors 
enter the rework cycle (Ford and Sterman 2003, Taylor and Ford 2006). 
c. Brooks’ Law 
As the task completion rate of a project begins to decrease management 
interventions such hiring and firing rates can increase, leading to the classic counter-
intuitive phenomenon found in software and systems development known as Brooks’ 
Law (figure 10), which states that adding developers to a late software project only 
makes it later (Brooks 1975).  
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Figure 10: Brooks Law. Adding developers to a late software project can make it later due to the 
increase in communication and training required. This increase leads to lowered productivity, 
lowered progress and the potential for more increases in hiring developers to work on the delayed 
project. The balancing feedback to this loop is not represented here but will be covered in more 
detail in figure 13. 
As the task completion rate begins to decrease, project managers might decide to 
intervene by adding more developers (i.e. an increase in the hiring rate), which increases 
the communication overhead for the project, lowers the productivity and ultimately feeds 
back to further degrade the task completion rate (Abdel-Hamid 1988, Abdel-Hamid 
1990, Lyneis and Ford 2007). An increase in the hiring rate can also dilute the experience 
levels for the team (R5 in figure 10), which in turn increases the training overhead, 
lowers the productivity and ultimately feeds back to further decrease the task completion 
rate. Furthermore, as team experience erodes it is also common to see an increase in the 
error rate which also feeds back to lower productivity and pave the way for potential 
increases in both schedule pressure and hiring rates. 
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Figure 11: Causal loop diagram showing the interactions and relationships from figure 9 after 
integrating the effects of Brooks' Law (figure 10) on project productivity. 
 
d. Parkinson’s Law 
Having tried all the other options, a project manager might also decide to push the 
deadline of the project in an attempt to provide more time for the project team and 
increase the probability for success (B3 in figure 12). While this practice increases the 
time remaining and therefore should result in a decrease in schedule pressure, it also can 
lead to Parkinson’s Law which states that work expands to equal the time allotted for it 
(Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1989). A deadline push that increases the time remaining on 
the project also increases slacking off which lowers productivity and feeds back to further 
increase schedule pressure. In addition, it can also lead to a common software and 
systems development practice called gold plating, whereby developers, with more time 
due to the deadline push, decide to add superfluous features to software versions even 
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though they were not scheduled to be part of the planned release cycle (Lyneis and Ford 
2007). While this practice might initially appear to be a good use of the extra time, it 
often times leads to additional errors that otherwise would not be in the rework cycle. 
 
 
Figure 12: Causal loop diagram showing the integration of variables such as "deadline slips" and 
Parkinson's Law and the effects of those variables on the project team's productivity. 
 
e. Integrated Project Dynamics Model 
Once we integrate figures 9-12 into figure 13 the complex dynamics associated 
with projects becomes increasingly apparent and the policy decisions made by project 
managers are exposed as both cause and effect of both positive and negative feedback, as 
well as both increases and decreases in project productivity. The model illustrates the 
difficulty associated with project policy decisions and the counter-intuitive nature of 
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those policy effects as they interact with an increasing amount of system variables, which 
in turn alter system states in a non-linear fashion.  
 
Figure 13: Conceptual model designed to illustrate typical systemic project behaviors and their 
causal connections Adapted from Sterman (2000), Lyneis and Ford (2007), Ford and Sterman (2003). 
 
The conceptual model referenced in figure 13 does not account for some 
additional variables that could contribute to schedule pressure such as, aggressive 
deadlines set by management, overly optimistic assumptions of productivity and/or 
quality, customer interventions, satisfaction levels or increases in customer feature 
requests. For the purposes of this study those variables will be considered outside the 
boundary scope and therefore exogenous to our system. The relevant concept is that 
Schedule Pressure, the central variable for this model, is common in projects, and 
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management interventions, in the form of traditional project control techniques, represent 
both Schedule Pressure cause and effect. 
f. Client Interactions  
It is important to note that while the majority of research referenced in this paper 
refers to ripple and knock-on feedback structures associated with internal project actions, 
policy decisions and interventions, further reinforced by figure 13’s model boundary 
which implicitly considers client interaction as exogenous to the system, external sources, 
such as customers or clients, can trigger or amplify some of the aforementioned project 
dynamics referenced in figure 13 (Rodrigues 1998). Rodrigues (1998) states that client 
initiated scope creep, low-balled project proposals followed by change orders, as well as 
deadline slips, all contribute to feedback dynamics that directly affect and degrade project 
performance.  
 
Figure 14: Causal loop diagram illustrating the feedback structure associated with external 
influences (e.g. clients/customers) on the internal project dynamics referenced in figure 13. 
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Figure 14 illustrates some of these external source dynamics and demonstrates a 
few important areas of concern regarding the impact of client behavior on project 
performance. The dynamics associated with figure 14 could also be integrated into figure 
13 and would demonstrate the added effect of client initiated scope creep on work 
remaining. Client initiated scope creep can increase work remaining on a project as more 
and more change requests or feature adds pile up. This can lead to an increase in schedule 
pressure, deadline slips and a decrease in client trust. As client trust begins to degrade, 
progress reporting usually begins to increase, which reduces productivity and further 
degrades schedule performance. As deadline slips mount and client trust degrades, their 
tolerance for future deadline slips also decreases, which in turn produces more schedule 
pressure, more progress reporting and feeding back to further degrade schedule 
performance. In the worst case contracting scenario, significant deadline slips can 
ultimately lead to litigation efforts initiated by the client (USN, Laverghetta and Brown 
1999, Sterman 2000), which divert and/or decrease project resources, leading to a 
reduction in productivity and a further decrease in schedule performance. 
g. Project Estimation Techniques 
Given the importance of the project deadline and the schedule pressure that results 
from that deadline, it is not surprising that some of the literature (Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnick 1991) suggests how projects begin, and more specifically how their scope and 
associated schedules are estimated, is of critical importance to the outcome of the project. 
They assert that the most common method is one referred to as “estimation by analogy,” 
whereby the project team uses historical data and experience as the guiding factors to 
produce future work package estimates (Abdel-Hamid and Madnick 1991).  Abdel-
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Hamid and Madnick (1991) suggest that this common tendency to base future estimates 
of a project’s (or work package’s) cost and schedule based on similar past project reveals 
organizational bias in the scheduling process and can ultimately lead to higher project 
costs and increasingly longer project schedules over time. 
 
Figure 15: Estimation by Analogy. Estimates influence schedules which influence actions and 
decisions by the project team and management, which affects project performance ultimately 
affecting the next project's estimates. 
 
The logic follows that if one work package is analogous to another from previous 
experience it should therefore require the same amount of time to complete. This method 
makes several dangerous assumptions, most of which, if not all, can turn out to be false 
as the project progresses and significantly reduce the probability of project success. First, 
it assumes that the historical data driving the new estimate is not itself already bloated 
with deliberate and/or excessive slack. Second, it assumes the same people, or different 
people with the same skills sets, will be working those tasks. In addition, if there are 
different people involved with the same skill sets it also assumes that those people will 
work, make decisions and deliver an identical result in fit, form and function as compared 
to the people that produce the original work package from which the estimate was made. 
Third, it assumes that the interdependency of project tasks are not themselves dynamic 
and that their relationships may vary in linearity from project to project. Lastly, it 
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assumes that management interventions, actions or decisions, as well as those involving 
the project team, will be the same for the new work package as they were for the one the 
new estimate was based on. 
Abdel-Hamid and Madnick (1991) assert that management’s tendency to cling to 
unrealistic schedules by adding developers, instead of adjusting the project deadline to 
more appropriately reflect the level of effort required to finish the project, is political in 
nature. They suggest this happens for two reasons; first, project managers are hesitant to 
show a slip in the project schedule “too early” in the project, and second, if they re-
estimate now they risk doing it again later and looking bad twice (Abdel-Hamid and 
Madnick (1991). This type of political decision making in projects can also become 
unintentionally institutionalized and consequently ignored by management as one of the 
potential causes for reductions in project performance, as well as unnecessary increases 
in schedule pressure and the down-stream dynamics associated with that increase. 
 
Figure 16: This causal loop diagram illustrates management's tendency to cling to unrealistic project 
schedules (underestimated) by simply adding more people to the project. This produces an increase 
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in project cost leading to an increase in pressure to cut corners (B1). That pressure can reduce 
human resource levels, but does so at the expense of quality standards. As quality standards decrease 
rework increases, further increasing the project’s actual amount of work.  
Some of this political decision making is guided by conventional wisdom in the 
project management community, as well as research from two empirical studies and an 
informal review of over 500 completed contracts, stating that when “a contract is more 
than 15 percent complete, the [final] overrun at completion will not be less than the 
overrun to date, and the [final] percent overrun at completion will be greater than the 
percent overrun to date” (Christensen 1993, 45). In addition, Christensen (1993, 45) 
states that “once a contract is 20 percent complete, the cumulative Cost Performance 
Index (CPI) does not change more than 10 percent; in fact, in most cases it only 
worsens.” Given these project management industry rules of thumb, it becomes obvious 
that the pressure to not show a schedule slip early in the project life cycle produces a 
dynamic whereby project managers choose to add developers and cost to the project 
instead of analyzing estimates and potentially re-estimating scopes and schedules to 
achieve a better target end date, which in turn reinforces the dynamics associated with 
Brooks’ Law (figure 10).  
1V.  System Archetypes as Project and Organizational Learning Tools 
 The study of system archetypes as project learning tools is another contribution 
the system dynamics methodology makes to the project management discipline. These 
generic system structures provide a conceptual foundation so that project teams can 
identify common generic project variables and their associated dynamics, communicate 
their cause-effect relationships, map them to the project or issue at hand and plan 
effective intervention strategies for mitigating problematic project behavior. Effective 
learning usually requires some level of pattern recognition; system archetypes provide 
these project patterns, which can be analyzed to improve performance. 
Both Meadows (2008) and Sterman (2000) provide detail on system archetypes as 
they relate to generic system behavior; however, Hart (2008) takes these system 
archetype concepts a step further using software engineering, and various real-world 
software case studies, to illustrate archetypes as they relate to the software development 
process. Hart’s (2008) research, and associated exploration into system archetypes 
applied to software engineering, provides an IT project manager with a solid foundation 
for analyzing typical software project behaviors and designing intervention strategies to 
mitigate the risks inherent in those software engineering system archetypes. While there 
are several system archetypes to learn from, the scope of this paper will limit us to a 
discussion on two areas common to systems/software development – software quality and 
process improvement efforts.  
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a. Drifting Goals – Software Quality Erosion 
  The first archetype we will explore is the Drifting Goals archetype. Senge (1990), 
Meadows (2008) and Hart (2008) all describe this archetype as a situation whereby 
organizational/project goals are allowed to drift or slowly erode to a state that is 
ultimately unacceptable to the organization; however, because it happens slowly over an 
extended period of time it goes unnoticed or becomes institutionalized into the business 
process. Meadows (2008, 122) refers to this phenomenon as the “boiled frog syndrome” 
and suggests, “some systems not only resist policy and stay in a bad state, they keep 
getting worse.” A frog’s biology for sensing danger is hard-wired to sudden 
environmental changes, not gradual ones; therefore, if you place a frog in water at room 
temperature and slowly turn up the heat to a boiling level it will be content until it is too 
late to save itself (Senge 1990). Project delays, communication issues and inaccurate 
project control data can all have the same effect on a project, turning a slow gradual 
decline in performance into outright project failure. 
 The systemic structure of the drifting goals archetype, as referenced in figure 17, 
provides the project manager with a generic understanding of the dynamics surrounding 
goal erosion behavior. Figure 18, takes this concept a step further and applies it to 
software development to illustrate the unintended consequences of goal erosion with 
regards to software quality standards. 
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Figure 17: Generic structure of the drifting goals archetype 
 The behavior over time we are concerned with here is either the increase or 
decrease of both Project Performance Goal and Actual Project Performance over time. 
The Performance Gap variable is the difference between the Project Performance Goal 
and the Actual Project Performance. When the gap increases, it produces two systemic 
reactions; the first (B1) is the project control loop which states that as the Performance 
Gap increases, so do project team interventions to improve performance, and as Project 
Performance Improvement Interventions increase Actual Project Performance increases, 
albeit most often after some amount of delay. This delay is important because as it 
increases it produces a sentiment among team members that fixes are failing and/or 
improving the project performance is a fruitless effort, which ultimately triggers the 
introduction of the B2 loop – the Drifting Goals loop. This feedback mechanism results 
in a balancing feedback loop that increases the # of Adjustments to Project Goals when 
the Performance Gap increases. Those interventions then reduce the Project 
Performance Goal and ultimately reduce the Performance Gap, which makes the team 
believe they are succeeding, even though the reality is that should this behavior continue 
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it can result in a continued degradation of project performance when one accepts a 
variable like software quality as an appropriate measure of project performance. 
 Figure 18 illustrates these drifting goals dynamic as it applies the erosion of 
software quality over time. For the purposes of this example, we will continue the 
practice of considering software quality as an appropriate measure of project 
performance, which according to Hart (2008) is a function of delivered functionality and 
software defects. 
 
Figure 18: The erosion of software quality. Software project related example of the drifting goals 
archetype (Hart 2008).  
Most, if not all, software development projects are forced to deal with the cost vs. 
schedule vs. quality dilemma. Software quality can degrade over time as quality goals 
shift due to increased pressure to deliver products on time and under budget (i.e. pressure 
to declare success). Figure 18 is designed to illustrate the dynamics behind this dilemma. 
Like figure 17, the Quality Gap is the difference between the Quality Goal and the Actual 
Quality. Hart (2008) suggests that this gap produces three main dynamics. First are the 
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system interventions or Actions to Improve Quality (B1), such as testing and process 
improvement techniques. Second are the Actions to Lower Quality Goals such as 
releasing a product prior to testing it properly and reworking errors. These actions are 
usually a result of pressure to declare success and the fact that the Actions to Improve 
Quality are often expensive and time consuming; the logic is that the customer is still 
using the product right now and not complaining that much so why not. Hart (2008) 
suggests that in general, the reality is that people tend to tolerate software that is beneath 
their expectations or standards. Third are the Customer Expectations, which when 
considered as part of the system equation produce the potential dynamic whereby 
software of acceptable quality gets worse over time. If the Actual Quality of the software 
decreases, so does the Customer’s Expectation of that software, which reduces the 
Quality Goals, reduces the Quality Gap, reduces the Actions to Improve Quality and in 
turn further reduces the Actual Quality of the software. The erosion of software quality, 
as illustrated in figure 18, is therefore a systemic problem including both the project team 
and the customer. 
b. Limits to Growth – The Paradox of Process Improvements 
The second archetype to briefly explore is the limits to growth archetype 
mentioned in the literature (Senge 1990, Meadows 2008, Hart 2009). Hart (2008) suggest 
this to be the generic structure associated with the aforementioned 90% syndrome in 
projects; and while Lyneis and Ford (2007), Ford and Sterman (2003) and Abdel-Hamid 
(1991) don’t specifically reference the limits to growth system archetype in their 
research, their research on the 90% syndrome describes a system structure and behavior 
that is consistent with this archetype. 
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Figure 19: Simple generic system structure of a limits to growth archetype. 
 This limits to growth archetype is simple in nature and revolves around the 
Project Performance variable, which when increased causes a positive feedback loop 
(R1), increasing Productivity and further increasing Project Performance. This growth 
spiral does have its limits though, represented in the B1 loop, whereby some constraint on 
the system produces a limiting condition (e.g. the number of developers writing code is a 
constraint that produces a limiting condition), which ultimately balances out the system, 
reduces project performance and ultimately demonstrates the limits to growth archetype. 
 Figure 20 illustrates this limits to growth concept as it applies to project 
management with an example Hart (2008) refers to as the process improvement paradox. 
For the purpose of this example, the causal loop diagram has been kept relatively 
simplistic so as to clearly demonstrate the archetype; however, this dynamic could easily 
be integrated into figure 13’s overarching structure, and if you look closely, while the 
variables names are different, the concepts overlap with two of the loops – B1 and R1. 
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Figure 20: Project management specific example of a limits to growth archetype (Hart 2008). 
 B1 of figure 20, or the Closing the Schedule Gap balancing loop, illustrates that as 
Schedule Variance (i.e. the difference between where you hoped to be in the project 
schedule and where you actually are) increases, Work Intensity increases, which can 
cause an increase in Production, an increase in Completed Tasks, and therefore, a 
decrease in Schedule Variance. However, increases in Work Intensity can also lead to a 
degradation of Process Improvement Efforts among the project team, as more time is 
dedicated to completing tasks and less time is therefore dedicated to improving 
project/production processes in order to increase Production Capacity. R1, and more 
specifically the relationship between Work Intensity and Process Improvement Efforts, 
clearly demonstrates the limits to growth archetype in systems and provides project 
managers with the foundation for applying these concepts, as well as their associated 
interventions, to better improve their project performance. 
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c. Inter vs. Intra Project Learning 
The organization, or team learning process, is of critical importance for project 
success and the study and application of system archetypes aid in that learning process. 
Kotnour (2000) suggests there are two forms of learning in a project environment – 
“inter-project learning” and “intra-project learning”. The goal of inter-project learning is 
to increase project and team learning acumen; it is the knowledge assimilation, 
combination and dissemination of lessons learned across projects to facilitate knowledge 
creation, and ultimately, better project performance (Kotnour 2000). The dissemination 
process is critical for organizations interested in mitigating the risks of perpetuating poor 
project performance across both similar and disparate projects. Assimilation and 
combination involves the post-mortem analysis of a project, which is an important project 
plan phase (Kotnour 2000).  
However, this inter-project learning (i.e. post-mortem) process alone does not 
provide a panacea for solving problematic project behaviors and mitigating the risks of 
their associated outcomes. Equally important is to engage in the accompanying practice 
Kotnour (2000) describes as “intra-project learning,” whereby the project team develops 
methods and processes for capturing near real-time project data (e.g. number of software 
bugs released to production) and integrates that data into the project lifecycle, creating 
knowledge and improving project decision making. While this practice should 
accompany inter-project learning, it often times does not, as more effort and resources are 
often times applied to the project’s close out phase, or post-mortem analysis, in support 
of the next project. 
54 
   
 
 
The study and development of system archetypes primarily falls within the 
domain of inter-project learning; however, as this paper will discuss later, they can also 
be used for intra-project learning when one considers the theoretical integration of system 
dynamics models with the traditional project management process framework as outlined 
by the Project Management Institute’s Project Management Body of Knowledge (2008). 
Further discussion regarding this novel practice will be presented later in Chapter V. 
Intra-project learning focuses on the task of individual projects with the goal of 
producing a successful project outcome, to build individual and team capabilities, and 
ultimately, to support inter-project learning as the data that is captured during the project 
is then assimilated, combined and distributed in support of that mission (Kotnour 2000). 
It identifies, analyzes and solves problems during the course of a project as opposed to 
the post-mortem methodology, a method widely used in both traditional project 
management processes and system dynamics analysis to projects (USN, T. Laverghetta and 
Brown USN  1999), which relies on project data captured during a project to provide insight 
into how to improve performance on future projects. 
Unfortunately, because the very definition of a project according to the Project 
Management Institute’s Body of Knowledge (2008, 5) is that of a “temporary endeavor 
undertaken to create a unique product, service or result,” it stands to reason that solely 
relying on inter-project learning as a strategy for increased project and organizational 
performance is myopic; particularly when one considers that projects vary in 
requirements, complexity and dynamics from one project to the next. This consideration 
underpins the foundation for research, (Rodrigues and Bowers 1996, Rodrigues and 
Williams 1998, Williams 1999, Williams 2003, Taylor and Ford 2006, Lyneis and Ford 
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2007) in both the system dynamics and project management communities, that attempts 
to improve traditional project management processes and methods by modifying, 
replacing, and in some cases, augmenting them to better govern contemporary project 
dynamics and effectively integrate new models into the existing project management 
framework as outlined by PMI (2008).  
V.  Discussion: Integration of System Dynamics with Traditional Methods and 
Suggestions for Future Research  
 
Williams (1999) and Rodrigues (1997) provide a rough outline for this new 
methodology – the integration of dynamic models with traditional project management 
methodologies, and other areas in the literature (Lyneis and Ford 2007, Taylor and Ford 
2006, Lyneis and Cooper 2001, Rodrigues and Bowers 1996, Klein 2007, Hart 2008, 
Haas 2009) also suggest the need to re-examine the use of our traditional techniques for 
project management in an attempt to develop better strategic, as well as tactical, 
methodologies. Many of the current operational models, while useful, are lacking in a 
holistic/systems approach to project management; therefore, integration of system 
dynamics models into the entire project management framework, and not solely as a post-
mortem analysis tool to support inter-project learning and knowledge dissemination, 
represents a novel practice in the project management field and one that could potentially 
benefit project teams as well as the organizations they support.  
This augmented project management framework would be designed to better 
manage projects in real-time and provide functioning quantitative models that project 
managers could use during a project instead of just after the project in support of the next. 
These models would be integrated into the traditional project management toolset (PERT, 
CPA,WBS, OBS, Network Diagramming) and lifecycle in a way that shares project data 
(e.g. % of tasks completed for a particular work package, or number of software defects 
released to production) in near real-time with the previously mentioned operational tools 
used to plan and control projects. 
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At this stage in its evolutionary development, system dynamics models applied to 
project management are predominantly used as post-mortem tools and occasionally as 
models used prospectively (e.g. estimation techniques). Progress towards this next step of 
integration into the entire project life cycle (see figure 21) is currently more of an 
academic exercise than a mature methodology. The literature at this point does not 
suggest any real-world case of this novel approach to augmenting the project manager’s 
tool set. The literature does, however, consistently emphasize the need for new models to 
adapt to the ever increasing complex nature of information technology projects, as well as 
to improve the mediocre performance that continues to plague the industry.  
 
Figure 21: Conceptual model of the integration of system dynamics models (SD Models) in the 
traditional project management framework. Lessons learned and modeling ‘what if” scenario results 
are aggregated at the strategic level and continuously fed into the traditional plan and control project 
management framework.  
Models that originated from the defense and aerospace engineering projects of the 
1950’s are useful but need to be augmented with more contemporary, quantitative and 
dynamic models that allow project managers the ability to test “what-if” scenarios (e.g. 
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will adding developers at the later stages of this project make the project stall even more) 
before, during and after their projects in an attempt to facilitate knowledge creation 
throughout the entire project life-cycle and organizational learning prowess among all 
project team members. Properly and continually calibrated system dynamics models, 
using as close to real-time project status data as possible, integrated into a project 
manager’s tool set (see figure 21) could serve many purposes including:  
1. Effective project management training, mentoring and skill set building. 
The use of CLDs and quantitative stock and flow simulation models could 
provide project managers with a learning environment that enables them to 
see the feedback structures present in a particular project management 
problem (e.g. client scope changes) and run simulations to test/validate 
their managerial intuition on how best to intervene. These tests could serve 
to educate managers on the 2nd and 3rd order effects of their interventions 
and where in the system it is best to intervene (i.e. which levers to adjust). 
2. Improved project estimation and risk analysis/mitigation techniques  
3. Dynamically adaptive project plans/network diagrams  
4. Scenario analysis used to plan intervention strategies should problems 
arise throughout the course of the project and post-mortem analysis to 
support the project’s close-out phase and facilitate inter-project learning. 
Intervention strategies must also be adaptive given the complex nature of 
modern-day IT projects and the challenges this type of knowledge-work 
presents.  
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Rodrigues and Williams (1998) developed a conceptual model called the Project 
Management Integrated Model (PMIM) for how this integration might look and broke it 
down into both a System Dynamics Operational Model (SDOM), as well as a System 
Dynamics Strategic Model (SDSM). They suggest using the integration of system 
dynamics models as a way to develop a more sophisticated approach to project network 
models that would include feedback processes designed to deliver more effective 
modeling of project activity durations and costs (Rodrigues and Williams 1998). In 
addition to the integration of system dynamics models with the established project 
management processes, Rodrigues (2001) also suggests the use of system dynamics 
modeling within the Project Management Body of Knowledge risk management 
processes, thereby providing an alternative, yet complementary, method for managing 
project risks. 
Unfortunately, at this stage in its evolution, the literature suggests little has been 
done to normalize, implement and test these integrated models in practical organizational 
situations. While this represents undoubtedly a massive undertaking, it is one which has 
the potential to positively influence the direction of project management research and 
practice; further research in this area is warranted. Simply identifying lessons learned at 
the end of a project, and using those lessons as a means to improve future project 
performance, is insufficient to advancing the performance rate of information technology 
projects and the project management discipline in general. The delay associated with 
team learning and the development of effective management interventions must be 
reduced; knowledge creation, combination, assimilation and dissemination, as well as 
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risk mitigation strategies and tactics, must be developed and implemented throughout the 
entire life-cycle of the project, not just at the end of a project and in support of the next.  
In addition to the integration of system dynamics models and simulation into the 
traditional project management framework, the use of system archetypes as a project 
management learning tools should also be further researched, developed and applied to 
specific areas of project management such as information systems projects and web 
application development. While there will always be overlap in the concepts explored in 
these system archetypes, different project types, such as the development of complex and 
diversely distributed cloud computing applications, call for specific examples to be 
developed, validated and circulated amongst project management professionals. This 
knowledge creation and dissemination process could facilitate the development of a new, 
more systems-thinking oriented world view for the discipline. 
However, while the use of system dynamics as a project team learning tool is of 
particular importance to advancing the project management field, we should not limit the 
discussion to simply using these tools as strictly an education tool. More research must be 
done to propagate the use of system dynamics as not just an academic exercise, but also 
as a strategic planning and project control toolset that project managers can use to 
dynamically and adaptively manage complex projects throughout their entire life-cycle. It 
is important to note, however, that integrating system dynamics modeling and simulation 
techniques into the entire project life-cycle would not work very well on novel projects. 
Projects where an organization has relatively decent experience would represent fertile 
ground for this type of new approach. For example, if an organization is experimenting 
with new technology, new business processes and/or a type of project it has never 
61 
   
 
 
engaged in before, the integration of system dynamics models into the project 
management process will not only be lacking in value-added, it might actually detract 
from the end-result and hinder progress because there is no historical data available from 
which one could effectively initially calibrate the model. Projects that become somewhat 
repeatable (e.g. developing a management information system for a government 
organization) are good examples of where this integration would be applicable. Even 
though these projects are unique in nature, they should contain enough similar project 
variables and dynamics to calibrate a model with minor adjustments and account for 
some of the project’s unique elements. 
Lastly, more research and development could go into expanding the project 
dynamics covered in section III; taking some of those concepts one step further into the 
development of quantitative system dynamics stock and flow models, derived from the 
project behavior dynamics CLDs. These models could be used to produce adaptive 
strategic models and simulations, which would enhance both the project managers’ skill 
and tool set, as well as provide a much need augmentation to traditional project 
management processes. 
VI.  Conclusions 
  The current state of information technology project performance is unacceptable 
and its failures are well documented in the literature. The discipline is poorly researched 
relative to other management disciplines and, coupled with the near exponential growth 
of technical and project complexity in the information technology industry, it is 
becoming increasingly evident that new systems-based models must be adopted for the 
field to advance and attempt to improve upon its mediocre performance rate. These new 
models do not necessarily need to replace traditional methods, but instead should 
augment them to produce a hybrid, or best-of-breed approach to managing complex 
IT/systems projects. 
Because the nature and complexity of a project should dictate the method by 
which it is controlled, the project management discipline must continue to develop its 
operational and strategic methods and not continue to solely rely on reductionist methods 
that were developed more than half a century ago and apply more to the types of projects 
that originated out of that era. A new era of highly complex, deadline driven knowledge-
work based information technology projects has developed in recent decades and dictates 
we take a holistic approach to project control, or suffer the consequences for ignoring to 
do so. This failure to properly adapt our methodologies and processes has been cited in 
the literature as both cause and effect for low project performance rates, the 90% 
syndrome or outright project failure. Adjustments to traditional models, the development 
of new models and the integration of both where appropriate, must be done to effectively 
account for the new complexities introduced by the global information age. 
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Moreover, project management professionals should seek to develop new 
competencies in systems-thinking approaches to project management, as well as the  
modeling and simulation tools needed to aid in that development. This expansion of core 
competencies would appropriately augment the current knowledge base that favors the 
types of reductionist approaches advanced by the Project Management Institute. The use 
of system dynamics benefits the discipline in many ways including, improvements in 
management training in the form of dynamic "flight simulator" models, management 
skill-set building, estimation and risk analysis techniques, project plans and network 
diagrams, what if" based scenario analysis used to craft effective intervention strategies, 
as well as a “best-of-breed” approach to management where the appropriate tools are 
used in the appropriate situations instead of being universally applied.  
This area of research has just begun to tackle the project performance problem 
and will continue to search for new and improved methods for advancing the discipline. 
The value of system dynamics to project management is in its approach to effectively 
capture, communicate and strategically address project behavior issues using a systems 
approach that integrates both "soft" and "hard" variables into the model's equations. This 
is understandably a monumental task, especially when one considers the difficulty in 
adjudicating the validity of certain measures associated with soft variables; however, to 
ignore this task because debates over how to quantify certain aspects of a project can be 
contentious, is myopic in its approach and one might argue less effective because the 
model deliberately ignores the "reality on the ground," and consequently, is not 
representative of the system's true behavioral elements. System dynamics models applied 
to project management seek to be more inclusive of the project's true reality and, 
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therefore, should be developed and matured into useful tools to improve performance that 
are widely disseminated and developed throughout the project management community. 
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